The Atlantic Triangle: an impossible dream?

When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed the attendees of the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026, he delivered what is already being described as one of the great speeches of our time. The reason is that he described the geopolitical reality of the planet in a particularly stark manner.

“We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition,” the leader asserted, speaking about the crisis of multilateralism. He added that “middle powers must act together because if we are not at the negotiating table, we will be the main course,” he emphasized at an event that for years championed the cause of globalization.

These words serve as a backdrop when examining the possibilities of building, or at least developing, the “Atlantic Triangle”. The idea originated in the early 1980s, when a group of academics began examining the trilateral relationship between Latin America, the European Union, and the United States.
 

Another story

 
It goes without saying that the realities of that era are very different from those of today. Back then, the Cold War between Washington and Moscow was the dominant theme, while Latin America faced a debt crisis and military regimes in the region were becoming more the exception than the rule. After decades of more or less overt interventionism, the United States seemed more interested in consolidating democracy and freedoms south of the Rio Grande.

Meanwhile, the Old Continent was in the process of developing a scheme of deep integration that was still in its infancy. It suffices to recall that Spain and Portugal did not officially join the European Union until 1986, and that the Iron Curtain imposed by the Soviet Union fell in November 1989 with the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

These events caused the issue to lose relevance until around 2010, when it resurfaced. At that time, following the impact of the severe international financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers a couple of years earlier, Latin America drew attention for its relative economic resilience, having weathered the turbulent waters of the depression in the Northern Hemisphere without major disruptions.

In addition to the above, US foreign policy emphasized its preference for a global governance system based on shared rules and cooperation. This framework served to promote the policy of open regionalism in major Latin American capitals. Thus, free trade agreements or treaties were signed on both sides of the Atlantic with the expectation that they would generate investment and business opportunities, along with strengthened political ties.

The idea that things would be different materialized in writings and forums. For example, in 2012 the Ibero-American General Secretariat, based in Madrid, published a book with the suggestive title “Europe and the Americas: Finally, an Atlantic Triangle?”.

In its conclusions, it was stated that “within our diversity, we are part of the West and believe in three core values: democracy, development, and peace.” It was also acknowledged that “we share economic and cooperative interests,” while calling for “the development of a joint agenda for action.”

However, these good intentions did not translate into significant progress. Events such as the end of the commodity supercycle resulted in a sharp drop in Latin America’s growth rate, which in turn led to expressions of discontent and a shift in the political pendulum, both to the left and to the right.

Factors like this contributed to various regional integration efforts experiencing setbacks. This was the case with Mercosur, the Andean Community, and the Pacific Alliance, which in its early years was met with great enthusiasm.

While this was happening, China gained significant ground in trade. By the end of the last decade, it had become the top destination for exports from countries like Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, as well as the main source of imports for much of Central and South America.

Such expansion did not go unnoticed in Brussels or Washington. Donald Trump’s rise to power in 2017 brought an initial confrontation with Beijing, which ultimately benefited Mexican-made products. At that time, some academics spoke not of a triangle but of a quadrilateral with vertices on the other side of the two oceans that border the Americas.

Sebastián Santander, Professor of Political Science and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Liège in Belgium, argued in a text published in 2020 that “the growth, consolidation and assertiveness of Chinese power in international relations over the past twenty years has been highly influential on Latin American actors, counteracting European and American strategies for the continent and transforming the Atlantic triangle into a quadrilateral rivalry.”
 

Here we go again

 
Thus, Trump’s second term in the White House disrupted the established order. Among the many practical expressions of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) movement within the administration and the Republican Party itself, two stand out.

On one hand, there’s the use of trade instruments to attack allies and rivals, not only in terms of the exchange of goods, but also in terms of US foreign policy itself. Without needing to examine each unilateral action, the fact remains that the average tariff has increased significantly, reaching extremes like that imposed on Canada, involving Europe, and also affecting Latin America.

On the other hand, a new security policy reaffirms and adapts the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, which explicitly stated Washington’s opposition to further colonization of its neighboring territories. This updated version, also known as the Donroe Doctrine, reaffirms the United States’ dominance in the Americas.

A concrete expression of this vision includes attacks on vessels allegedly carrying illicit drugs in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Likewise, the “extraction” of Nicolás Maduro in Caracas on January 3rd, who is now detained in a New York prison, reaffirms a particular vision focused on security, which materialized in the “Shield of the Americas” initiative.

Such an attitude, reminiscent of the Big Stick policy promoted by Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of the 20th century, would likely have led to even more confrontations had it not been for a significant shift: the rise of right-wing or far-right leaders to the presidential palaces of the region. Since 2023, 13 of the last 15 elections (including Brazil’s) have benefited candidates from this ideological spectrum.

As a result, the term “pink tide”—which at the beginning of this decade described the preponderance of the left in Latin America—has been replaced by the “orange wave”, referring to the color of Trump’s hair. Descriptions aside, the central point is that political transformations occurred in both the North and the South.

With greater synchronization, friction should decrease as long as the path laid out in Washington is followed, prioritizing the fight against narcotics, illegal immigration, and the presence of organizations classified as terrorist groups. China is aware of this, but for the moment, its export power remains intact due to factors such as the surge in demand for electric and hybrid vehicles in Latin America.

How does this reshaping of reality leave Europe? Although Brussels signed the trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur on January 17th, after 27 years of negotiations, it remains to be seen how this opening will translate into trade and investment flows.

From a geopolitical and economic perspective, Europe needs to strengthen its ties with Latin America in the face of a more closed United States. Formally, both regions are proponents of multilateralism (with some exceptions) and open regionalism. In terms of mutual benefit, there is interest in key resources and market access, as well as complementary economic models.

Equally important are migratory flows, both historical and recent. It is estimated that between 1850 and 1950 more than 10 million Europeans left for Latin American countries to start a new life, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Venezuela.

For several decades, the tide has turned. In Spain alone, the number of people born in Latin America is estimated at more than five million, equivalent to more than 10 percent of the total population, a phenomenon that has intensified in recent years.

Perhaps this factor will ultimately prove fundamental in making the Atlantic Triangle less disproportionate.

Ideally, it should be an equilateral triangle, where each segment is the same length as the other two, but this will depend on the actions of governments, the private sector, and citizens in redesigning a relationship based on understanding between Europe and the Americas, a relationship in which everyone benefits. Nothing more, but also nothing less.