The unmaking of emerging markets? Rethinking global trade in the wake of the 2025 tariff doctrine

On April 2, 2025, President Donald J. Trump’s administration unveiled a sweeping tariff regime that may mark the formal end of the preferential global trade order. At the center of the policy is a revised “Reciprocal Tariffs” schedule, which applies differentiated duties on a country-by-country basis, some as high as 41% — in response to what the White House described as “decades of asymmetric trade treatment and currency manipulation” by U.S. partners.

The policy is a sharp deviation from historical norms. Countries such as Lesotho (99% tariffs on U.S. goods), Mauritius (80%), and Guyana (76%) now face significantly heightened duties on their exports to the United States. Even nations traditionally viewed as low-threat or strategically neutral, such as Fiji, Iceland, Brunei, and Ethiopia, are caught in this net. Across the board, the message is clear: preferential access is no longer a right but a revocable privilege.

For the global economy, and capital markets in particular, this may represent a structural inflection point. The very architecture that underpinned the rise of emerging markets, liberalized trade, access to developed market consumers, and the assumption of goodwill from Western capital is rapidly crumbling.

The unraveling of the ‘development bargain’

The post-Cold War global economy rested on a relatively stable compact: emerging and frontier markets would supply inexpensive labor and commodities; developed nations would offer capital, consumption, and market access. The implicit goal, especially for the U.S., was the integration of these economies into a rules-based order that would support both development and geopolitical alignment.

Reciprocal tariffs, as now conceived, fundamentally dismantle that logic. They pivot the U.S. posture from “benevolent hegemon” to “transactional peer.” From a strategic standpoint, this marks the shift from comparative advantage to managed competition.

Market implications: a five-point recalibration

1. CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND COST OF CAPITAL 

Emerging market risk premia are highly sensitive to trade predictability. When market access is re-politicized, sovereign spreads widen, currency volatility increases, and foreign direct investment stalls. For many affected countries, this will translate into a materially higher cost of capital, raising debt service burdens and curbing infrastructure development.

2. TRADE ELASTICITIES AND EXPORT SUBSTITUTION 

Tariffs of 30–40% are rarely absorbed by exporters alone. U.S. importers will begin to shift sourcing to countries not currently penalized — Mexico, Canada, and domestic producers in reshored industries. Smaller economies that have benefited from narrow comparative advantages (e.g., textiles in Lesotho or food processing in Ghana) risk disintermediation.

3. EMERGING MARKET EFTs AND PASSIVE UNDERPERFORMANCE 

Broad-based EM exposure through vehicles like EEM and VWO is disproportionately tilted toward countries now under scrutiny. As earnings forecasts are revised downward and local currencies weaken, index performance will diverge further from U.S. benchmarks. Active managers may begin to overweight “friendly” EMs or shift capital entirely to G7-aligned markets.

4. INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT AND THE EROSION OF THE WTO 

This policy shift may render World Trade Organization frameworks inert. By redefining trade equity as parity rather than development-sensitive, the U.S. has exited the moral commitments of the post-Bretton Woods era. What follows may be a more fragmented, less enforceable trade regime characterized by regionalism, bilateralism, and coercive leverage.

5. GEOPOLITICAL REORIENTATION 

Many of the impacted nations will seek alternatives. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the BRICS expansion present viable, if imperfect, substitutes for capital and trade anchoring. The U.S. risks ceding long-term influence on near-peer competitors by prioritizing transactional trade balance over strategic economic diplomacy.

The end of “emerging” as a narrative device

The label “emerging markets” has always been a functional fiction — a shorthand for economies in transition with assumed upward mobility. But this narrative relied on integration. What Trump’s 2025 tariff regime reveals is that the path to emergence is no longer paved with trade access. Instead, it will require political alignment, security collaboration, and economic resilience in the face of protectionism.

Some markets may adapt, leveraging regional blocs, developing domestic capital markets, or reorienting trade toward China and India. Others will stall. The divide between “emerging” and “submerging” markets may accelerate in the coming decade.

Beyond globalization

President Trump has articulated, perhaps unintentionally, a post-globalization trade ideology — one in which reciprocity is measured not against ideals but against tariffs. For emerging markets, this is an existential challenge. For investors, it is a regime shift. Capital will keep pursuing growth opportunities. But access, stability, and alignment will now matter more than ever.