Is the future still Atlantic?

“The future of Europe, Latin America, and the United States will not be decided by the history we share, but by the ability to build together what does not yet exist.”

We are living through a historic turning point. The certainties that guided international decisions for decades have lost some of their explanatory power, while new variables such as security, resilience, technology, energy, and power now shape states, markets, and societies.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, we learned to interpret international relations primarily through an economic lens: productivity, comparative advantages, logistical efficiency, and prices. This logic still holds true, but it is no longer sufficient. Geopolitics has returned, and it’s here to stay.

Today, deciding who produces, who exports, who buys, and under what conditions increasingly involves considerations of national security, strategic alignments, and power struggles. Goods, capital, technology, and production chains are no longer merely economic assets; they have also become instruments of pressure, negotiation, and, in some cases, coercion.

It is common to speak of transition. However, perhaps we are facing something deeper: the overcoming of the historical cycles that structured the international order for decades, or even centuries. The unipolar era, consolidated after 1991, is giving way to a more fragmented distribution of power. The financial system, anchored in the dollar and oil, faces pressures stemming from the energy transition and the search for transactional alternatives. The multilateral architecture erected after 1945 is suffering from erosion and a loss of effectiveness. And the very historical centrality of the West, forged over more than five hundred years, is facing a redefinition.

It is in this context that the Atlantic Triangle —comprising Europe, Latin America, and the United States—can acquire renewed importance. Not out of nostalgia, nor solely due to historical and cultural affinities, but because their concrete interests converge in areas essential for prosperity.

The business community recognized this before the governments did. In Brazil, American and European companies have consolidated a strong presence for decades in sectors that extend beyond foreign trade. They are integrated into the financial system, industry, services, infrastructure, and the agri-food sector. And something even more interesting has occurred: many of these companies have ceased to be mere foreign subsidiaries. They have assimilated Brazilian skills, talent, and business culture, transforming their local presence into competitive platforms for other markets.

In this sense, transatlantic integration is not just a relationship between parent companies and subsidiaries; it is a process of joint value creation.

Government action, however, has not yet fully reflected this business reality. There are significant signs pointing to a prioritization of transatlantic relations, but achieving concrete progress remains a challenge. Trade is perhaps the best example.

The provisional application of the trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union, which began last May, theoretically opens a new stage of integration. However, its implementation will still require arduous political, regulatory, and corporate work. The same is true for the Mercosur-EFTA agreement. These instruments demonstrate that there is room to bring markets closer together, but they also highlight the time and energy needed to transform strategic affinity into effective access.

With the United States, the last two years have revealed another dimension of the problem . The so-called “tariff hike” demonstrated how trade mechanisms can also be used as tools of geopolitical pressure. On the other hand, the reaction of the private sector—especially US companies with interests in Brazil—has shown that economic interdependence can act as a moderating factor.

This is where China must enter the equation . Not as a rhetorical threat, but as an unavoidable economic reality.

If the points of the Atlantic Triangle remain excessively closed off from one another, businesses and consumers will naturally seek alternatives.

The risk lies not simply in “losing” markets to the East, but in failing to build, among long-standing partners, the necessary conditions for competitiveness to compete in the emerging world.

Centuries of ties between Europe, Latin America, and the United States do not guarantee the future success of this relationship. History generates political capital, but it is no substitute for strategy. If the opportunity for integration is missed, the costs will be felt precisely where they matter most: in competitive access to food, energy, infrastructure, and critical supplies, within a world marked by war in Europe, instability in the Middle East, and vulnerable supply routes.

For the private sector, this translates into a concrete need: legal certainty, diversified supply chains, predictable regulations, and open markets that enable long-term investment.

After all, geopolitics is no longer a matter reserved for foreign ministries; it has entered boardrooms, industrial planning, and investment decisions.

The upcoming Ibero-American Summit in Madrid offers an opportunity to reaffirm the centrality of our relationship. But reaffirmation alone is not enough. It is imperative to transform affinity into concrete action, discourse into tangible instruments, and historical proximity into competitive advantages.

Businesses, parliaments, and civil society play a crucial role in this process . The integration of the Atlantic Triangle cannot depend on a photo op at a summit or the political cycle of a government. It must be built as a state policy: with increased trade, greater investment, regulatory certainty, and, above all, open dialogue between partners who recognize each other as equals.

The choice is not simply between the Atlantic and the Middle East. The real choice is to actively participate in building the new international system or to adapt to an order designed by others. Reality rarely waits for us to be ready for it. On this occasion, the greatest asset of the Atlantic Triangle may well be precisely our capacity to prepare together. If Europe, Latin America, and the United States manage to transform their historical interdependence into a renewed common strategy, they will not only preserve their leading role but also make it a new source of prosperity. Ultimately, the future of the Atlantic will not be decided by the shared history of our peoples, but by our capacity to build together what does not yet exist.